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Introduction 
I told the Shah that if the Army budget were 
increased we could do little if any thing for 
agriculture, education or public health. He said, 
"Very well, then; we'll have to postpone those 
things." 
This incident occurred in 1943, a year after the Shah had succeeded 
his father and was recounted by A. C. Millspough, 1 then financial 
advisor to the Iranian government. 
By the 1970s, however, the Iranian government was denying the 
relevance of the "guns versus butter" tradeoff for the country. The 
Shah posed the problem differently, "What is the use of having an 
advanced industry in a country which could be brought to its knees 
when faced with any small asinine event?" Asked on a subsequent 
occasion whether the desire for maximum national power implicit in 
such defense expenditure was compatible with the efforts to achieve 
maximum economic development, he replied, "It is not only 
1 A. C. Millspugh, Americans in Persia (Washington': Brookings Institution, 
1946), p. 77. 
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compatible but essential. The one is worthless without the other. 
There is no economic power without military power. 2 
On the other hand, defense expenditures in particular have been cited 
by several observers, such as Halliday,3 as having had a detrimental 
impact on the country's economy, thus, in part contributing to 
internal tensions that ultimately resulted in the revolution. 
The existing literature on this period in Iran's history is, 
unfortunately, largely anectdotal, with little or no attempt to 
determine empirically the links between military expenditure and 
various economic performance indices. Furthermore, from a 
theoretical point of view, a logical case could be made either way 
that the likely net impact of military expenditures was negative or 
positive.4 
Classical economic theory, for example, would predict, on the basis 
of resource allocation, that defense will decrease investment or 
civilian consumption and thus reduce growth or welfare. The 
military burden would have to be justified on the basis of other 
social welfare gains such as an increase in collective security. 
Keynesian theory, on the other hand, could claim that in the 
presence of inadequate effective demand the operation of the 
multiplier would imply an increase in national product resulting from 
additional defense expenditure; thus there could be some economic 
justification for military spending. If the economy operates with 
substantial excess capacity, then additional demand and output 
would raise capacity utilization, thereby increasing the rate of profit 
and possibly accelerating investment. Whether in the short and long 
run the former or latter effect dominates will determine the final 
outcome of defense on the country's economic performance.5 
Clearly, the impacts of military expenditure will also vary from 
2 Shahram Chubin "Implications of the Military Buildup in Less Industrial 
States" in V. Ra'anan, ed., Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military 
Buildup in Less Developed Countries (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), 
p. 268. 
3 Cf. Fred Halliday, "Iran, the Economic Contradictions" MERIP Reports (July-
August 1978), pp. 9-18; Iran: Dictatorship and Development (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1979); "Theses on the lranijin Revolution," Race and Class, 
(Summer, 1979), pp. 81- 90; "The Genesis of the Iranian Revolution," Third 
World Quarterly (October 1979), pp.1-16. 
4 Cf. Steve Chan, "The Impact of Defence Spending on Economic Performance: 
A Survey of Evidence and Problems," Orbis (Summer, 1985), pp. 403-434. 
5 Sadat Deger and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less 
Developed Countries," Journal of Conflict Resolution (1983), pp. 335-353. 
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sector to sector. The sections that follow attempt to throw some 
light on this interesting and controversial topic through quantifying 
the impact of Iran's defense expenditures on the main sectors of 
economic activity. 
Economic and Social Impact of the Military in the 
Pre-Revolutionary Iran 
In pre-revolutionary Iran, the military played an important economic 
and social role. The economic impact was manifested in at least five 
ways:6 
1. Since the 1920s, the armed forces took a large part of 
government revenues. Under Reza Khan, the military 
budget constituted on average a third of all expenditures; 
despite the enormous rise in government revenues in the 
1960s and 1970s, military expenditure continued to absorb a 
significant revenue portion. 
More precisely, between 1953 and 1970, defense 
expenditures rose from $67 million to $844 million, a more 
than twelve-fold increase; between 1970 and 1977, they rose 
by almost the same proportion again to $9 ,400 million. In 
197 4, the year in which oil price rises were reflected in a 141 
percent increase in the previous years' total expenditures, 
defense spending was 32 percent of total budget allocation 
and, while this percentage declined somewhat after that, it 
was estimated that in the 1973-8 Plan defense would amount 
to 31 percent of total planned expenditures or over 9 percent 
of GDP. 
2 Since the 1920s, the armed forces had been an important 
source of employment. In 1976, the 300,000 men under 
arms represented 3 percent of all those employed and 5 
percent of those in non-agricultural employment. 
The oil boom, however, altered the relation of the military to 
the labor market; whereas previously it was a relatively 
privileged branch of employment, competition from the 
6 Fred Halliday, Iran : Dictatorship and Development, pp. 71-71. 
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private sector for technicians altered the comparative 
advantages of each branch and put the armed forces at a 
disadvantage. Like the private sector, the armed forces 
experienced a growing lack of skilled pesonnel after 197 4. 
3. The Iranian military played an important role in production. 
By the 1970s, the country had a number of defense plants 
assembling transport vehicles and producing armor plating 
and ordinance. 
4. The armed forces also had their own service units. The 
Bank Sepah was owned by the army and specialized in 
providing cheap loans to officers. The Cooperative 
Organization of the Forces of Order in 1941 provided cneap 
food, clothing and other goods: its imports were exempted 
from customs duties, the railways were bound by law to 
carry military goods free of charge and, since land reform in 
the early 1960s, the army had acquired direct control of the 
produce of some villages. 
5. Finally, the armed forces played a direct role in the country's 
development programs. The Army had organized the 
Literacy and Health Corps. These units were sent out to 
serve in villages. The expansion in base facilities, especially 
in the southern part of the country in the 1960s and 1970s, 
also had pronounced economic effects: the population of 
Bandar Abbas, the Gulf port chosen as the new naval HQ, 
rose from 18,000 in 1960 to 200,000 in the early 1970s. 
In sum, while military development had in large part determined the 
character of much current expenditure and the size of the multiplier 
impact on the civilian sector of the economy, the priority given to the 
military budget diverted resources from other projects and consituted 
a distortion of the country's overall development. 
Iran, despite its oil revenues even after 1973, was still short of 
capital relative to its needs, and the funds spent on arms were 
thereby lost to forms of productive investment. The same applied to 
skilled labor and infrastructural growth. 7 
7 Ibid., p.73. 
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The Iranian military also played a marked social role, evident in at 
least four respects:8 
1. The armed forces were a vehicle of social mobility. Since 
many of the Iranian officer corps came from relatively 
unprivileged backgrounds (lower civil servants, farmers), 
the rise of the officer corps as a force in Iranian society 
under the Pahlavi regime introduced a new component in the 
ruling class. This social composition may, among other 
factors, explain why the army supported land reform and did 
not protect the large landowners. Lower down in the ranks, 
conscription also acted as a means of social mobility. 
2. The army had also been used as an instrument of national 
integration by the Shahs. In the 1920s and 1930s, Reza 
Khan used the army as a coercive instrument for crushing 
tribal resistance. Under the Shah, sons of tribal leaders were 
encouraged to become army officers, and the regime tried to 
promote the enlistment of men from the oppressed 
minorities. 
3. Under the Shah, the armed forces acted as an instrument for 
diffusing the regime's ideology and, in particular, loyalty to 
the monarch. 
4. Finally, the armed forces provided personnel for running 
other government activities. The officer corps, therefore, 
provided a reserve of personnel on which the regime could 
draw to administer wider sections of the economy. 
General Considerations of the Defense/Growth Relationship 
In general, proponents of military expenditures justify them not only 
on grounds of national security and stability, but also in economic 
terms. As Benoit9 noted, expenditures may contribute to growth 
by: 
8 Ibid., pp. 73-74 
9 Emile Benoit "Growth and Change in Developing Countries," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change (1978), p. 277. 
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(1) feeding, clothing and housing a number of people who 
would otherwise have to be fed, housed and colthed by the 
civilian economy ... (2) providing education and medical 
care as well as vocational and technical 
training (3) engaging in a variety of public works--roads, 
dams, river improvements, airports, comm-unication 
networks, etc.--that may in part serve civilian uses, 
and... ( 4) engaging in scientific and technical 
specialties ... which would otherwise have to be performed 
by civilian personnel. 
In addition, the military sector is often the first to come in contact 
with modem technology and can train its personnel in handling 
sophisticated equipment. This experience can then be transmitted to 
other sectors of the economy. 
The basic criticism against defense expenditures is that they 
represent a significant opportunity cost.10 Chanll has summarized 
the four main negative effects. First is the modernization effect 
which was also noted by Benoit. The result may be an income shift 
(as civilian GDP is reduced), a productivity effect as government 
expenditures exhibit "negligible rates of measurable productivity 
increases,"12 or a "crowding out" of civilian consumption and 
investment. Second, Chan suggests a balance of payment effect if 
growth is export-led: military expenditures could lead to a "chronic 
and serious displacement of capital. and talent from the most dynamic 
sectors of civilian production to military production."13 Third, 
Chan notes the use of R & D resources in defense may hurt the 
country's technological and productivity base. A final criticism is 
that defense expenditures are often import-intensive.14 If imports 
are financed by external loans, the external debt rises. If imports are 
financed through export earnings, resources are absorbed which 
might have better alternative uses. Thus, one can readily see why 
no consistent relationship has emerged between growth and defense. 
10 W. Leontief and F. Duchin, Military Spending: Facts and Figures Worldwide 
Implications and Future Outlook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); 
and United Nations, The Relationship Between Disarmament and Development 
(New York,: United Nations, 1982). 
11 Steve Chan op. cit. (1985), pp. 403-434. 
12 E. Benoit, "Growth Effects of Defence in Developing Countries," 
International Development Review (Summer 1986), pp. 745-752. 
13 Chan, op. cit., p. 417. 
14 R. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen, "Profiles of Current Latin American Arms 
Producers," International Organization (Summer 1986), pp. 745-752. 
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In short, a logical and convincing case can be made for defense 
expenditures either helping or hindering growth in the Third World. 
Clearly, whether defense expenditures impact positively, negatively 
or neutrally on economic growth in Third World countries is an 
issue only empirical research can resolve. 
Empirical Studies 
The impact of military expenditures on economic growth in 
developing countries has been empirically examined by a number of 
scholars.15 Rothschild 16 rank correlated growth, exports and 
military spending for 14 OECD countries between 1956 and 1969 
and concluded that increased defense spending tended to reduce 
exports and growth. Benoitl7 used 1950-65 data for 44 developing 
countries and estimated a model which included investment, defense 
and foreign aid. He concluded that "contrary to my opinion, 
countries with a heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid 
rate of growth, and those with the lowest defense burdens tended to 
show the lowest growth rates."18 
Dabelko and McCormick19 assessed the impact of defense spending 
on education and public health expenditures and grouped countries 
by form of the government: personalist, centrist, and polyarchic. 
They found significant opportunity costs existed for education and 
health in every country; the level of development had little impact on 
this cost; and personalist regimes tended to have the highest 
15 For an extensive review, see Chan, op. cit., and A. Cappelen, et. al., 
"Military Spending and Economic Growth in OECD Countries," Journal of Peace 
Research (1984), pp. 361-373. 
16 Rotschild, Kurt, "Military Expenditures, Exports and Growth," Kyklos (1973), 
vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 804-813. 
17 E. Benoit, Defence and Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass: 
Lexington Books, 1973), and E. Benoit, ~'Growth and Change in Developing 
Countries," op. cit. 
18 E. Benoit, "Growth and Change in Developing Countries," op. cit., p. 271. 
See Also N. Ball "Defence Expenditures and Economic Growth: A Comment" 
Armed Forces and Society (1985), pp. 298-301. 
19 David Dalbelko and James McCormick "Opportunity Cost of Defence: Some 
Cross-National Evidence," Journal of Peace Research (1977) pp. 145-54. 
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opportunity costs (the measurement of the opportunity cost of 
defense is particularly controversial.)20 
Lim21 estimated a Harrod-Domar type model and concluded that 
"defense spending is detrimental to economic growth" in developing 
countries.22 He estimated regression equations for different regions 
of the world and concluded:23 
Our results also show marked inter-regional 
differences in the relationship between defense and 
growth. Economic growth in the African and 
Western Hemisphere LDCs in the sample seemed to 
be adversely affected by defense spending. On the 
other hand, there is no relationship between defense 
and growth in the other two groups of LDCS (Asia 
and Middle East and Southern Europe). 
No theoretical explanation was offered to explain why the 
hemisphere would affect the role of defense on growth. Frederiksen 
and Looney24 assumed an identical model specification and tested 
for a relationship between defense and growth in the context of their 
resource constrained/unconstrained hypothesis. Once again, they 
found that the coefficient for defense spending was positive (and 
statistically significant) in the richer group but insignificant in the 
poorer group. 
Smith and Smith.25 predicted that military expenditures may 
contribute to growth through the direct impact on resource 
mobilization of equipment and skills, the provision of necessary 
infrastructure, and an internal supply response to the military 
demand. Indirectly, they hypothesized that military spending might 
hurt the savings to output ratio. They found that military 
expenditures led to a decline in savings relative to income which 
20 See C. Lyttkens and C. Vedovato, "Opportunity Costs of Defence: A 
Comment on Dabelko and McCormick," Journal of Peace Research (1984), pp. 
395-397. 
21 David Lim, Another Look at Growth and Defence in Less Devloped Countries," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change (1983), 377-384. 
22 Ibid., p. 379. 
23 Ibid. 
24 P.C. Frederiksen and Robert Looney, "Another Look at the Defence Spending 
and Development Hypothesis," Defence Analysis (1985), pp. 205-210. 
25 Dan Smith and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditures, Resources and 
Development, " Paper presented for the United Nations Group of Government 
Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. 
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retarded growth. The effect on modernization and productivity was 
positive but weak, and they stressed the sensitivity of their results to 
model specification and estimation procedures. On the issue of 
causality, they recognized that military expenditures and savings 
could cause growth, but also that growth might prompt more 
defense and savings. They found that the small direct positive effect 
of defense was outweighed by the indirect effect of a lower savings 
rate. 
In a similar study, Deger and Smith26 examined the interaction of 
military expenditures, savings and growth and found that military 
expenditures had a small positive effect on growth through 
modernization but a larger negative effect on savings. Taylor, et. 
af.21 estimated a regression equation which related the growth rate 
of output to changes in exports, population, the defense burden, 
capital inflows and capital stock. For all developing countries and 
for separate regional groupings, they found that increase in military 
expenditures had a significant negative impact on economic growth. 
Further, increases in the defense burden depressed the 
investment/GDP ratio which suggests that military expenditures are 
on balance competitive with investment. 
The same general conclusion was reached by del Pando.28 
Focusing on just five South American countries, he found that if 
military expenditures were to be cut back, the reduction in demand 
could be more than compensated by spending the same resources in 
other sectors of the economy. The Faini study29 indicated that the 
growth of military expenditures reduced the growth of investment 
and agricultural production. A one percent rise in the military's 
share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was associated with a 23 
percent and 18 percent drop in the shares for investment and 
agriculture in GDP, respectively. 
26 Sadat Deger and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditures and Growth in Less 
Developed Countries," Journal of Conflict Resolution (1983), pp. 335-353. 
27 Lance Taylor, R. Faini and P. Annez, "Defence Spending, Economic Structure 
and Growth: Evidence Among Countries Over Time." Paper prepared for the 
United Nations Groups of Government Experts on the Relationship Between 
Disarmament and Development. 
28 Jose del Pando, "Declaration of Ayacucho: Analysis and Quantification of a 
Possible Agreement on Limitation of Mili\ary Expenditure in Latin America." 
Paper presented to the United Nations Group of Government Experts on the 
Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. 
29 R.Faini, P. Annez and L.Taylor, "Defence Spending, Economic Structure and 
Growth: Evidence Among Countries and Over Time," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change (1984), pp. 487-498. 
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Relevance of Previous Studies of Iran 
In terms of pre-revolutionary Iran, the results obtained by 
Frederiksen and Looney30 are suggestive of the impact military 
expenditures may have had on the country's economic growth. 
Much of their cross-sectional work has entailed grouping developing 
countries on the basis of resource constraint, with their general 
results indicating that defense impacts negatively on countries 
experiencing relative shortages of savings-investment and foreign 
exchange. On the other hand, their results tend to show an overall 
net positive impact of defense expenditures on growth in those 
developing countries possessing relatively unconstrained economic 
conditions. On the basis of their several papers, Iran was classified 
as a relatively unconstrained country in the 1950s and 1960s, but 
became resource constrained in the 1970s. 
This result may be counter-intuitive given the oil price increases in 
the 1970s experienced by Iran. However, most commentators31 
on the Iranian economy confirm the fact the Iranian govemments's 
overly ambitious development plans in the wake of the dramatic 
increase in oil revenues after 1973 actually created increased 
resource scarcity in the country. 
The expansion of domestic demand far beyond the country's output 
potential and the capacity to import goods and services inevitably 
resulted in a marked acceleration of the domestic rate of price 
inflation. The rate of increase in retail prices rose from 3.7 percent 
during the Fourth Plan period (1968-72) to 15.5 percent in 1974. In 
order to curb the price rises, instead of reducing public sector 
expenditure, the regime embarked on an anti-profiteering campaign. 
Owing to the suppressed inflationary pressures that existed in the 
system and to the government's failure to remove bottlenecks 
effectively, consumer prices started accelerating to 16.6 percent in 
1978 and finally to 25.1 percent in 1977, while the growth rate of 
real investment in construction fell from 53.2 percent in 1975 to 
22.9 percent in 1976 and to only 2.7 percent on 1977. While total 
gross domestic fixed capital formation pt constant prices had grown 
by 64 percent in 1975 and 21 percent in 1976, in 1977 it grew by 
30 P.C. Frederiksen and R.E. Looney, op. cit. 
31 Cf. R.E. Looney, The Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1983). 
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only 3.4 percent. In fact, for the first time since 1976 private sector 
real investment in machinery and equipment, as well as in 
agriculture, decreased by 6.8 percent in 1977.32 
Firouz Vakil has noted that:33 
Oil revenues may well be a mixed blessing, 
depending on the size of the annual liquidity 
injections relative to the availability of 
complementary factors of production. Indeed, these 
revenues are, on the one hand, like the blood of the 
economy carrying badly needed investment resources 
to particular areas for purposes of expanding 
productive capacity; and on the other, they are 
capable of producing an excess liquidity situation, if 
capital resources become suddenly out of line with 
other complementary factors of production (such as 
skilled labor, technology, organizational skills, 
natural resources or general infrastructure services). 
This duality renders the planning task all the more 
difficult under conditions of financial surplus, since 
it requires a shift of emphasis in the planning circles 
from an allocation of resources according to the real 
scarcity factor, or a combination of them. 
In a similar vein, Razavi and Vakil stated:34 
In a sense, the Shah dismissed the views of his 
technocrats and called for a Big Push (in the 
investment area) interspersed by a few key targets. 
Some of these were production of 15 million metric 
tons of steel, electrification of the railway system, the 
setting up of several nuclear power plants, building 
oil refineries and petrochemical plants, construction 
of six-lane superhighways connecting the Gulf ports 
to the capital, rapid development of the country's 
ports and, last but not least, the development of an 
32 Thomas Walton, "Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in 
Iran," Cambridge Journal of Economics (September 1980), pp. 271-292. 
33 Firouz Vakil, Determining Iran's Financial Surplus 1352-1371: Some 
Management Concepts (Tehran: Institute of International Political and Economic 
Studies, 1975), p. 6. 
34 Hussein Razavi and Firous Vakil, The Political Environment of Economic 
Planning in Iran, 1971-83 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 74. 
Role of Military Expenditures in Pre-Revolutionary Iran's Decline 63 
impregnable defense infrastructure ... the question 
of feasibility almost did not enter the equation. 
(emphasis added) 
In fact, Razavi and V aki135 attribute the Iranian Revolution to the 
fact, after 1973: 
1. The development patterns and strategies that were chosen 
and implemented by the Shah's regime moved the economic 
system out of its sectoral, regional and social balances; 
2. The management system of the country was rigidly top-
down with the Shah making the major economic decisions 
himself and with no provision or tolerance for the feedback 
of corrective signals, and 
3. The injection of vast ·oil revenues into the economy 
intensified the incapacities of the sytem and led to explosive 
trends. 
Razavi and Vaki136 point out that these conclusions should not, of 
course, be taken to imply that economic forces were the only (or 
most important) factors behind the collapse of the regime. The 
merely suggest that the economic system itself had developed an 
internal mechanism that intensified the further deterioration of the 
political-economic situation. 
Iran's shift in the early 1970s from a resource unconstrained to a 
resource constrained economy would, according to Frederiksen and 
Looney, imply an alteration in the impact of military expenditures on 
growth from positive to negative. The implication being that the 
Shah's military build-up directly led to the economic deterioration 
preceding and perhaps precipitating the overthrow of the regime. 
Before we use cross section results of the type cited above to see if, 
in part at least, the post-1973 deterioration in the Iranian economy 
can be attributed to increased military expenditures, it should be 
pointed out that a recent paper by Joerding37 has cast some doubt 
on the validity of previous cross-sectional analyses. 
35 Ibid., p. 102. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Wayne Joerding, "Economic Growth and Defense Spending: Granger 
Causality," Journal of Development Economics (April 1986), pp. 35-40. 
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In larger part, previous cross-sectional studies have used ordinary 
least squares (OLS) to estimate: 
Growth = X + MILX 
Where growth is the economic growth rate, X is a vector of 
explanatory variables and MILX is a measure of military spending. 
As Joerding correctly points out, this formulation is only appropriate 
if MILX is econometrically exogenous, otherwise the parameter 
estimates are biased and inconsistent. So the reliability of these 
studies depends on the implicit assumption that military spending is 
an econometrically exogenous variable. 
Clearly, as Joerding38 points out, it is likely that military spending is 
at least partially dependent on the overall performance of the 
domestic economy, if for no other reason than that domestic 
production imposes a kind of budgetary constraint on expenditures. 
During periods of low growth, military spending must share the 
financial constraint with other government programs, but it is 
unlikely to be completely immune. This reasoning and other 
arguments39 imply that military spending is an endogenous variable. 
At least the possibility bears scrutiny. 
Using a sample of 57 countries and both ACDA and SIPRI data, 
Joerding,40 using the Granger causality test, found that economic 
growth caused military spending caused economic growth: 
Since Granger non-causality is necessary for strong 
or weak economic exogeneity in state models, we 
must conclude that military spending potentially is an 
endogenous variable. Consequently, studies using 
OLS to estimate equations like (1) are seriously 
flawed, all the parameter estimates being biased and 
inconsistent. 
Joerding41 goes onto conclude that: 
Since Granger causality is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for strong exogeneity, we cannot 
conclude economic growth is an endogenous variable 
38 Ibid., p. 39. 
39 Cf. Deger and Smith, op. cit. 
40 Joerding, op. cit., p. 39. 
41 Ibid., p. 39. 
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with respect to military spending to economic 
growth. Thus, the evidence on this question is 
ambiguous. 
In Iran's case, the use of GDP in the growth equation may invalidate 
the conditions for exogeneity (since oil revenues are a large 
component in GDP), and it is very apparent that during this period 
military expenditures preceded increases in oil revenues. 
To overcome this methodological difficulty, the next section 
examines the impact of military expenditures on the Iranian economy 
through the use of time series analysis of the non-oil components of 
the economy. 
Time Series Analysis 
Given the limitations of cross-sectional analysis in assessing (during 
different time periods) the impact of military expenditures on various 
facets of the Iranian economy, a more direct approach is needed to 
determine: (1) the nature and time phasing of the impacts on the 
economy produced by the military expenditures, and (2) any 
possible changes over time in the parameters of this relationship. 
It is hypothesized that over time military expenditures may have 
contributed to the Iran economy directly, through Keynesian 
demand contributions to GDP, or indirectly, through carry-over 
effects stemming from increases in such areas as the nation's stock 
of human capital. More specifically, the indirect contribution to 
growth embraces Hirshman type linkages and can broadly be 
considered as a sequence of multiplier accelerator mechanisms. 
Theoretically, indirect contributions (or spread effects) can continue 
to occur long after specific military expenditures have occurred.42 
The overall impact of military expenditures on the Iranian economy 
is assumed to have had many determinants, including technonolgy, 
the extent to which investment opportunities generated were taken 
advantage of by domestic entrepreneur~ the ability to attract foreign 
factors, and the contribution to human capital. 
42 Robert Looney, "Impact of Oil Revenues on the Pre-Revolutionary Iranian 
Economy," Middle Eastern Studies (January 1985), pp. 61-71. 
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Obviously, neither the time pattern exhibited nor the relative sizes of 
dirrect or indirect military contributions to growth needs to be fixed 
and could conceivably have varied between subperiods. Provided 
that investment and demand opportunities generated by the growth 
of military expenditures are exploited and bottlenecks are not a 
constraint on growth, the model predicts that Iranian economic 
growth could be positively stimulated by military expenditures. 
To determine the impacts of military expenditures on the pre-
revolutionary Iranian economy, both non-oil gross domestic product 
and non-oil GDP by sector for the period 1959-77 were regressed 
on military expenditure. 
In addition, to test for structural changes associated with the 1973-
74 oil price increases and subsequent stepped up level of defence 
expenditures, two dummy variables43 DUMAX and DUMBX, 
were added to the regression equations, DUMAX was formed by 
multiplying real military expenditures by 0, 1959-1973, and 1, 
1974-77. DUMBX was formed by multiplying real military 
expenditures by 0, 1959-74, 1, 1975-77. Clearly a priori it is not 
possible to speculate whether increased oil revenues had an 
immediate impact (DUMAX) or a lagged (DUMBX) impact on the 
military expenditure non-oil income relationship, hence both 
variables were independently introduced into the regression 
equations. 
As noted above, one of the main limitations of cross section analysis 
is its inability to identify the timing of impacts. In particular, the 
empirical economic development literature44 has shown that many 
impacts of government expenditures demonstrated a distributed lag 
relationship,i.e., the impact of specific expenditures on income 
tends to decline over time in some type of decay scheme with the 
first year's impact the greatest, declining in subsequent years. 
Operationally,45 estimates utilizing Koyck distributed lag schemes 
of the form: 
43 A similar approach was used in R. Mallakh and M. Kadhim, "Absorptive 
Capacity, Surplus Funds and Regional C"pital Mobility in the Middle East," 
Reviste /nternaziona/e de Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, (April 1977), pp. 
308-325. 
44 Cf. L.M. Koyck, Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis (Amsterdam, 
North Holland, 1954). 
45 Cf. P. Rao and R. Miller, Applied Econometrics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 88-92. 
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Y(t) =a+ bx +cy(t-1) 
are used to measure both the indirect and distributed impacts of 
certain expenditures (x) on output (y). 
To improve the regression specifications (by avoiding spurious 
correlations) and at the same time test the robustness of the results, 
several control variables were also individually added to the 
regression equations. These variables included: 
1. Total gross capital formation, 
2. The labor force, 
3. Total private sector investment, and 
4. Investment and construction. 
The results (Table 1) show several striking patterns: 
1. In general, military expenditures had a positive impact on 
non-oil output in Iran, but this relationship turned negative 
after 1973-74 (as indicated by the positive sign for military 
expenditure and the negative sign for the dummy variables, 
DUMAX and DUMBX). 
2. This result holds after controlling for other sources of 
sectoral output such labor and investment. 
3. The result holds not only for non-oil output, in general, but 
also for the main producing sectors. 
4. The results are extremely robust in terms of the sign and size 
of the coefficients for military expenditures. 
To summarize, the regression results were highly significant and 
confirmed the net positive impact of military expenditures on non-oil 
income growth during this period. The impact of military 
expenditure was spread over time with the impact declining in future 
years. 
However, the high statistical significance of the dummy variables 
(DUMBX) and its negative sign indicate that the nature of this 
impact began to change begining in 1973-197 4. In short, marginal 
increases in defense expenditure began to negatively impact on 
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Iranian growth after 1973. Apparently, a number of negative 
impacts associated with defense expenditures began to manifest 
themselves by the mid-1970s, reducing considerably the 
contribution to growth previously associated with the country's 
defense allocations. 
The manner in which military expenditures in Iran shifted after 
1973-74 from making a positive contribution to non-oil output to a 
negative marginal contribution cannot be inferred from the results in 
Table 1. Clearly, increased resource constraints leading to higher 
opportunity costs associated with increased military expenditures, as 
the cross sections indicate, may have played a role in this regard. 
One way of identifying the general source of these resource 
constraints is to examine any particular public sector budgetary 
shifts occurring after the oil boom in such a way as to alter the 
pattern between government revenues and expenditures. 
To examine the relationship between government expenditures and 
oil revenues, distributed lag equations of the type estimated above 
were undertaken. Government expenditures were broken into three 
main categories: 
1. Military expenditures, 
2. Total public sector allocations, and 
3. Government consumption. 
The dummy variables were created by multiplying each type of 
expenditure by 0, 1959-73, 1, 1974-77 (DUMAX), or 1, 1959-74 
(DUMBX). 
As expected, the results (Table 2) indicate a strong link between 
each public sector expenditure and government revenues. 
Several notable differences by type of expenditure do exist, 
however: 
1. While both total government and public sector consumption 
expenditures show a strong distributed lag relationship, 
military expenditures exhibit a close direct link with 
government revenues. 
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2. While both total government expenditures and public 
consumption exhibited relative declines vis a vis government 
revenues after 1973-7 4, military expenditures maintained 
their pre-1973-74 relationship to revenues (DUMAX and 
DUMBX being statistically insignificant). 
One might conclude from these results that for political reasons 
military expenditures increased proportionately to oil revenues after 
1973-74 and, furthermore, the authorities may have diverted 
potentially productive resources away from other types of public 
sector activities to facilitate the post-1973 build-up. This relative 
shortage of productive resources may have contributed to the 
conditions experienced after 1973-7 4. 
Finally, it might be argued that due to increased resource constraint 
after 1973-74, all government expenditures declined in their ability 
to contribute to non-oil output and that military expenditures were 
not unique in this regard and thus should not be singled out as 
contributing to the country's economic decline. 
To examine this aspect of post-1973-7 4 Iranian fiscal policy, 
regression similar to those presented in Table 1 were performed. 
Instead of military expenditures, however, various types of 
government investment were used in place of military expenditures: 
1. Government investment in construction; 
2. Government investment in machinery; 
3. Total government investment, and 
4. Total construction (public plus private). 
To improve these estimates, a control variable, the labor force, was 
included in all the regression equations. 
The results (Table 3) indicate that, in general, government 
expenditures contributed to non-oil output (the main exception being 
manufacturing) for the period as a whole. Furthermore, in contrast 
to military expenditures, the marginal impact after 1973-74 was 
positive for all sectors. ' 
These results clearly indicate that military expenditures were unique 
in their marginal negative impact on private sector output after the 
1973-7 4 oil revenue boom. 
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Conclusions 
In his book, Economic Origins of the iranian Revolution, Looney 
suggested that a number of latent tensions inevitably resulted from 
the development process itself so that the authorities had no advance 
notice of the mass alienation developing in the country. In the Rise 
and Fall of the Shah, on the otherhand, A. Saikal47 put forth the 
idea that the Shah pursued two objectives that were inherently 
contradictory: preserving a strong monarchy while transforming Iran 
into a modem state, based upon the model of Western capitalism. 
According to Saikal, these twin objectives required policies that 
necessarily conflicted, creating a fundamental dilemma. 
R.K. Ramazani48 stated that the way in which the vast oil reserves 
were used magnified every weakness in the Iranian economy. 
According to him, the grandiose plans for developing the economy 
and atomic energy, the massive imports of food and consumer 
goods, the rapidly rising rate of inflation, the spreading corruption, 
the shortage of electricity, the infrastructural bottlenecks, the decline 
of agricultural productivity, and the maldistribution of wealth all 
contributed to the demise of the Shah. 
S. Akhavi49 suggested in Religon and Politics in Contemporary 
Iran that the secularization policies pursued by the Shah and his 
father seriously undermined the clergy's power and interests, 
leading to wide-spread resentment toward the dynasty among the 
ulama. Eventually, this provoked active opposition when the 
increasing bureaucratization of power was perceived as threatening 
the independence that they and their religious instituions had 
traditionally possessed. 
Taheri50 pointed to other factors in the Tehran daily newspaper, 
Kayhan International, saying that the public uprising against the 
47 A. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, (1980). • 
48 R.K. Ramazani, "Who Lost America? The Case of Iran," Middle East Journal (1982). 
49 S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State 
Relations in the Pahlavi Period (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1980). 
50 Amir Taheri, "Public Discontents," Kayhan International (July 13, 1978). 
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Shah was due to an accumulation of discontent with tight control, 
overcentralization, lack of sufficient debate, and a general feeling 
that corruption, inefficiency, and arrogance had struck the 
bureaucracy. And James Bi1151 in "Iran and the Crisis of 78," 
described the Iranian revolution as a multi-class phenomenon in 
which the people of Iran rose en masse against a hated decrepit 
system. 
The results presented above are consistent with all of these 
interpretations. They tend to indicate more precisely, however, the 
great economic costs associated with military build-up that took 
place after 1973-74. How much economic growth would have 
improved if military expenditures were held at their pre-1973 levels 
is hard to estimate precisely. The fact remains, however, that the 
economy would have been healthier, perhaps sufficiently so to 
defuse the tensions that ultimately resulted in the overthrow of the 
regime. 
Robert E. Looney, is a Professor of Economics at the Naval 
Postgraduate School 












IRAN DISTRIBUTED LAG IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON 
PRIVATE SECTOR OUTPUT, 1959-1977 
Independent Variables 
Total Total 
Lagged Military Gross Private Investment Statistics 
Dependent Expend- Capital Labor Invest- in Const- ---------------------------------------
Variable iture Dumax Dumbx Formation Force ment ruction RHO r2 F rm 
0.91 1.70 -0.72 (-0.59) 
(13.99) (4.38) (-4.07) (-3.03) 0.988 3429.59 1.98 
0.76 2.04 -1.08 0.24 -0.70 
(8.20) (5.33) (-4.75) (2.28) (-4.05) 0.999 4112.11 1.49 
0.86 0.59 0.08 -0.52 
(9.48) (2.64) (3.02) (-2.50) 0.998 2326.87 2.31 
0.89 1.61 -0.66 0.01 -0.58 
(11.06) (2.94) (-2.07) (0.25) (-2.99) 0.998 2565.97 2.03 
0.92 1.39 -0.78 0.54 -0.75 











Table 1 (continued) 
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Lagged Military Gross Private Investment Statistics 
Dependent Expend- Capital Labor Invest- in Const- ---------------------------------------
Variable iture Dumax Dumbx Formation Force ment ruction RHO r2 F rm 
0.69 2.50 -1.27 1.10 -0.72 
(7.06) (5. 73) (-5.28) (2.95) (-4.31) 0.999 5039.04 1.45 
0.94 0.61 -0.06 -0.52 
(10.41) (2.55) (-2.17) (-2.52) 0.998 1801.16 2.44 
-0.04 0.35 -0.25 0.02 -0.52 
(-0.18) (3.54) (-3.83) (2.35) (-2.85) 0.918 135.56 2.29 
0.86 0.01 0.06 -0.60 
(9.450 2.99 (2.55) (-3.14) 0.988 2455.50 2.61 
0.86 0.08 -0.01 0.010 1 -0.61 










Table 1 (continued) 
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Lagged Military Gross Private Investment Statistics 
Dependent Expend- Capital Labor Invest- in Const- ---------------------------------------
Variable iture Dumax Dumbx Formation Force ment ruction RHO r2 F [N{ 
0.93 0.16 -0.07 -0.52 
(10.41) (2.55) (-2.17) (-2.52) 0.998 1801.16 2.44 
0.21 0.14 -0.11 0.02 -0.66 
(1.41) (2.65) (-4.35) (2.64) (-3.19) 0.980 148.70 2.27 
-0.03 0.08 -0.08 0.44 -0.14 
(-0.12) (1.90) (-2.47) (2.47) (-0.62) 0.939 46.09 2.14 
0.15 0.18 -0.12 0.10 
(0.97) (5.49) (-4.99) (3.08) (-3.84) 0.982 172.21 2.11 
-0.10 0.13 -0.09 0.15 0.01 
(-0.50) (3.16) (-2.61) (2.36) (0.05) 0.921 34.86 2.02 
' 0.18 0.14 -0.11 0.06 -0.64 
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Private Investment Statistics 
Invest- in Const- ---------------------------------------
ment ruction RHO r2 F rNV 
0.10 -0.09 
(2.51) (-0.38) 0.934 42.70 2.10 
-0.40 
(-1.75) 0.995 1740.37 2.08 
-0.77 
(-5.02) 0.997 1098.15 2.31 
-0.77 
(-4.93) 0.997 1154.13 2.39 
-0.54 









Table 1 (continued) 
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Lagged Military Gross Private Investment Statistics 
Dependent Expend- Capital Labor Invest- in Const- ---------------------------------------
Variable iture Dumax Dumbx Formation Force ment ruction RHO r2 F rm 
0.58 0.09 -0.05 0.01 -0.48 0.988 260.37 2.39 
(2.03) (2.25) (-2.i8) (0.65) (-2.24) 0.988 260.37 2.39 
0.34 0.11 -0.03 0.02 -0.37 
(2.08) (6.84) (-3.39) (2.02) (-1.65) 0.997 . 940.91 1.86 
0.60 0.07 0.002 -0.85 
(6.42) (5.30) (1.72) (-2.77) 0.996 972.19 2.30 
0.62 0.11 -0.02 -0.60 
(7.85) (7 .17) (-2.84) (-3.10) 0.997 1329.92 2.31 
0.43 0.11 -0.35 0.04 -0.44 
(4.37) (1.84) (-4.05) (2.66) (-2.05) 0.997 1271.79 1.92 
0.13 0.12 -0.38 0.05 -0.23 
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(5. 71) (4.25) 
0.64 0.17 



























Private Investment Statistics 
Invest- in Const- ---------------------------------------
ment ruction RHO r2 F rm 
0.20 
(0.86) 0.993 596.34 2.17 
0.05 
(0.22) 0.996 191.07 1.94 
0.39 
(1.72) 0.984 437.67 2.11 
0.02 
(0.76) 0.996 1119.36 1.95 
0.45 
(-2.10) 0.988 248.31 2.18 
Table 1 (continued) 
IRAN DISTRIBUTED LAG IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON 
PRIVATE SECTOR OUTPUT, 1959-1977 
Independent Variables 
Total Total 
Lagged Military Gross Private Investment Statistics 
Equation Dependent Expend- Capital Labor Invest- in Const- ---------------------------------------
Activity Variable iture Dumax Dumbx Formation Force ment ruction RHO r2 F [NV 
(33) 0.50 0.15 -0.07 0.004 -0.66 
(3.38) (2.87) (-2.21) (l.32) (-3.72) 0.993 453.76 2.46 
(34) . 0.62 0.19 -0.10 -0.68 
(3.08) (4.08) (-3.53) (-3.84) 0.992 535.32 2.58 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols; Economic Data from Bank Markazi Iran, National Income of Iran 1338-50 (1959-72), Tehran: 
Bank Markazi Iran Bureau of National Accounts, 1975); Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report, various issues; Nominal Military 
Expenditures data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook, 
various issues (Philadelphia: Taylor and Finances); Construct Price Military Expenditures derived by deflating with the Iranian 
current price index (1975 = 1.00); regressions estimated with Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation technique to correct for serial 
correlation; r2 = correlation coefficient; F = F statistic; ( ) = t statistic; DW = Durbin-Watson Statistic. 
" 
Table 2 
IRAN: IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 

























































0.49 64.59 -14.17 -0.64 
(7. 82) (9 .34) ______ i-} .43) (-3 .41) 
Statistics 
r2 F [»I 
0.991 807.97 2.10 
0.993 549.04 2.37 
0.992 528.95 2.23 
0.992 924.85 1.89 
0.998 1615.47 2.45 
0.998 1913.02 2.32 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols; Economic Data from Bank Markazi Iran, National Income of Iran 1338-50 (1959-72), Tehran: 
Bank Markazi Iran Bureau of National Accounts, 1975); Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report, various issues; Nominal Military Expenditures 
data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament S/PRI Yearbook, various issues 
(Philadelphia: Taylor and Finances); Construct Price Military Expenditures derived by deflating with the Iranian current price index (1975 
= 1.00); regressions estimated with Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation technique to correct for serial correlation; r2 = correlation 
coefficient; F = F statistic; ( ) = t statistic; DW = Durbin-Watson Statistic. 
Lagged 
Sector Dependent 
E9uation Outeut Variable 















IRAN: IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
NON-OIL OUTPUT BY SECTOR, 1959-1977 
Independent Variables 
Govt. Govt. Total Total 
Investment Invest- Govt. Construe- Statistics 
in Const- ment in Invest- ti on ---------------------------------------
Labor Dumax Dumbx ruction Machiner~ ment Investment RHO r2 F rm 
0.06 0.009 -0.91 
(2.76) (2.25) (-9.17) 0.999 3561.7 2.45 
0.06 0.,005 -0.84 
(1.83) (0.83) (-6.40) 0.998 2483 .62 2.21 
0.27 1.49 0.34 
(4.01) (3.60) (1.51) 0.991, 453.87 2.17 
0.20 0.71 0.02 0.998 
(4.02) (2.71) (0.06) (2142.61) 0.999 2142.61 1.93 
0.28 2.53 0.62 0.04 
(4.63) (3.22) (0.51) (0.17) 0.996 845.21 2.07 
0.43 1.32 0.71 
(3.95) (4.73) (4.24) 0.977 169.88 2.13 
0.38 0.52 0.01 0.45 
(5.65) (2.33) (2.34) (2.13) 0.993 439.58 2.41 
' , .. 
Lagged 
Sector Dependent 














(14) Water Power -0.38 
Electricity (-1.23) 
.. "'I, 
Table 3 (continued) 
IRAN: IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
NON-OIL OUTPUT BY SECTOR, 1959-1977 
Independent Variables 
Govt. Govt. Total Total 
Investment Invest- Govt. Construe- Statistics 
in Const- ment in Invest- ti on ---------------------------------------
Labor Dumax Dumbx ruction Machiner~ ment Investment RHO r2 F rm 
0.35 1.04 0.53 
(4.08) (3.78) (2.57) 0.985 265.82 2.67 
0.33 0.57 0.39 0.13 
(4.08) (2.65) (1.28) (0.58) 0.996 787.38 2.34 
0.01 0.001 -0.65 
(3.01) (2.26) (-3.58) 0.998 2402.13 2.62 
0.02 -0.003 0.05 -0.50 
(2.69) (-0.06) (1.50) (-2.39) 0.998 1417.70 2.42 
0.01 0.15 -0.13 -0.67 
(2.87) ( 1.97) (-0.96) (-3.75) 0.998 1813.87 2.61 
0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.68 




(3.76) (2.29) (3.97) 0.910 40.68 1.65 
Lagged 
Sector Dependent 
E9uation Ou~ut Variable 
(15) -0.85 
(-2.71) 
(16) Transport- -0.34 
at ion (-1.94) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
IRAN: IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
NON-OIL OUTPUT BY SECTOR, 1959-1977 
Independent Variables 
Govt. Govt. Total Total 
Investment Invest- Govt. Construe- Statistics 
in Const- ment in Invest- ti on ---------------------------------------
Labor Dumax Dumbx ruction Machiner~ ment Investment RHO r2 F [NV 
0.02 0.04 0.01 0.57 
(5.73) (3.06) (0.66) (2.88) 0.967 89.77 1.99 
0.01 0.14 0.78 
(2.38) (5.58) (5.11) 0.934 57 .38 1.95 
0.02 0.62 0.08 0.80 
(4.38) (5.51) (4.72) (5.44) 0.980. 148.15 2.34 
0.009 0.18 -0.73 -0.39 
(4.00) (3.09) (-0.65) (-1.75) 0.992 371.67 2.35 
0.02 0.05 0.08 0.84 
(3.60) (4.39) (4.35) (6.51) 0.960 73.46 2.07 
0.02 0.12 0.84 0.897 34.90 1.96 
0.02 0.04 0.05 0.78 
(4.73) (6.28) (5.05) (5.19) 0.981 161.27 2.18 
0.02 0.09 0.77 
(2.44) (4.94) (4.97) 0.925 49.72 1.80 
(. 
Table 3 (continued) 
IRAN: IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
NON-OIL OUTPUT BY SECTOR, 1959-1977 
Independent Variables 
Govt. Govt. Total Total 
Lagged Investment Invest- Govt. Construe- Statistics 
Sector Dependent in Const- ment in Invest- tion ---------------------------------------
Equation Output Variable Labor Dumax Dtimbx ruction Machinery ment Investment RHO r2 F fJVV 
(23). 0.60 0.02 0.10 -0.09 0.47 
(2.54) (4.46) (4.19) (-1.65) (2.16) 0.98.9 257.27 1.78 
(24) 0.60 0.01 0.25 -0.21 0.34 
(3.42) (4.49) (3.48) (-1.93) (1.49) 0.989 282.90 1.94 
(25) 0.63 0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.40 
(2.62) (4.77) (4.09) (-1.72) (1.79) 0.989 296.40 1.84 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols; Economic Data from Bank Markazi Iran, National Income of Iran 1338-50 (1959-72), Tehran: 
Bank Markazi Iran Bureau of National Accounts, 1975); Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report, various issues; Nominal Military 
Expenditures data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook, 
various issues (Philadelphia: Taylor and Finances); Construct Price Military Expenditures derived by deflating with the Iranian 
current price index (1975 = 1.00); regressions estimated with Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation technique to correct for serial 
correlation; r2 = correlation coefficient; F = F statistic; ( ) = t statistic; DW = Durbin-Watson Statistic. 
